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,
: This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level in
a variable population context. We focus the attention on the Critical-Level
Egalitarian Rule, a social evaluation procedure which compares two social
states as follows: (i) It reproduces the leximin criterion when applied to vectors
of identical dimension and (ii) otherwise, it completes the small one with so
many times a variable critical-level as to make the two vectors equal in size and
applies the leximin criterion again. We prove that the use of a strict monotonic
critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule. This prob-
lem disappears when a weak monotonicity condition is required.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with comparisons among vectors of real numbers of (possi-
bly) di¤erent dimension; the context where these comparisons take place is the
evaluation of social states with di¤erent population in a welfarist framework.
Welfarist means that two social states are going to be compared by looking only
at the utility level achieved by each member of the society in the two social
states at stake. Most of the work done in the economic literature since the early
utilitarians focus mainly in the case in which the number of participants -the
population- is xed. Among the rules used to make such welfarist comparisons,
the utilitarian program, which chooses the social situation with the greatest util-
ity summation, has been one of the most studied. This is the rule underlying to
almost all of the theoretical and applied cost-benet analysis.
Other social evaluation rules hark back to the egalitarian principles; examples
of this line are: the welfare egalitarianism, the maximin rule or the leximin (the
Pareto-e¢cient extension of the maximin), etc...
In many cases, such welfarist comparisons among public policies involve to
compare societies with a di¤erent population. Moreover, in many relevant issues,
the key questions concern to the ranking between social states with a di¤erent
number of participants. The studies related to the European social security
systems should invoke comparisons among societies of di¤erent size. All birth-
control policies applicable to many countries of the underdeveloped world ought
to be made on the basis of such comparisons among utility vectors of di¤erent
size.
Again, in this setting, the utilitarian rule -which is very well dened for any
size of real vectors- has been deeply analyzed in [6], for instance. In this work,
the authors describe two types of economic contexts where utilitarian procedures
seem to work very well. One is the timeless variable population case. The other
is the notion of altruism in an intergenerational framework.
According to the later interpretation, a social policy is an action today that
produces utility consequences for today and tomorrow. In this case, that social
policy induces a utility vector of n components, in which the i -component rep-
resents the utility achieved by the representative individual of the i generation.
The egalitarian -and e¢cient- perspective, as the opposite of utilitarianism, is
the leximin rule. When the population is xed, this rule recommends the social
policy which maximizes the utility of the worst-o¤ individual -or generation,
depending on the context- in a lexicographic way: if the worst-o¤ individuals
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in two given situations are equally well, the rule looks at the two second worst-
o¤ individuals; or to the next worst-o¤ individuals, up to the point in which
a clear priority is reached. This rule is a strict order: the only situations
which are indi¤erent from the planner view to a given one, are all of its utility
permutations.
Unlike the utilitarian rules, the leximin has no immediate extension to the
variable dimension case. In this paper we propose a suitable extension for the
leximin criterion in a variable population context. Our proposal takes as a basis
the notion of a critical utility level, introduced in [8]. This idea has also been
discussed in [3], [6], [9] and [10]. A critical-level is a utility amount such that
the addition to a given society of a new component with precisely such a critical
utility level, makes the society to be equally well-o¤. This notion makes sense
in both contexts. In the variable population context, it forces the society to
welcome new members if the welfare level of the new born is expected to be
equal or greater than the minimum needed to preserve life, health and dignity
of a human being. In an intergenerational context, it means that no policy
should be implemented if it is expected a utility level below that critical-level
for some generation in the future under consideration.
In [6], the critical-level utilitarian rules are characterized by a di¤erent set
of axioms depending of the two mentioned contexts. The critical-level has also
been incorporated to the maximin rule in [9].
In the former work the critical-level is supposed to be constant. In the later
it is allowed this critical-level to be di¤erent for di¤erent initial societies. We
nd more appropriate the notion of variable critical-level. We cannot evaluate
a birth-control policy in India by applying the critical-level which would be
reasonable -unanimously accepted- in Canada. We cannot pretend the critical
utility level to be independent of the actual utility vector of the society. At the
end, any social evaluation cannot be independent of the cultural and historic
background of the society itself.
This paper explores the introduction of a variable critical-level, in the same
vein as Bossert, when we restrict our attention to an extended egalitarian prin-
ciple. To compare two vectors of di¤erent dimensions, we complete the small
one with so many times a variable critical-level as to make the two vectors equal
in size, and then we apply the usual leximin criterion.
We assume rst the critical-level as a function of the utility vector which
denes the society. Such a function satises the strict monotonic condition:
whenever some individual becomes strictly better-o¤ being the rest at least
3
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equally well-o¤, then the critical-level of the society increases. This assumption
ts very well with the idea behind the variable critical-level: A richer society
welcomes new members at a minimum standard of living greater than a poorer
one.
Examples of that kind of variable critical-levels are arithmetic and geometric
means, weighted or not.
Surprisingly enough, the use of the leximin evaluation with a strict monotonic
critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule. This con-
stitutes our rst impossibility result: There is no strict monotonic critical-level
which produces a transitive leximin evaluation.
Next step is to weaken the strength of the monotonicity condition required for
the critical-level function. We show that when we impose a weak monotonicity
property, then there exists a class of variable critical-level functions for which
the leximin procedure is a transitive social ordering.
Before introducing variable population welfare criteria, some notation is needed.
The number of people in some given society will be denoted by (the
set of positive integers). stands for the set of real (positive real)
numbers and is the n-fold Cartesian product of A vector
is interpreted as a distribution of individual utilities,
where it is assumed that these utilities are fully measurable and interpersonally
full comparable. Moreover, for reasons that will become clearer in the sequel, it
is also assumed that for all distribution of individual utilities,
. stands for the union, for all of
And for all given mean
respectively, and
Finally, for any and let be the permutation of with
By means of a variable population social welfare criterion, distributions of
utilities which are not necessarily of the same dimension can be compared. For
a binary decision criterion on , is a subset of If we
write We assume that is asymmetric with the usual interpretation that
means  is better than . We dene the indi¤erence relation by
not and not then we declare indi¤erent to when none is
better than the other. We dene the relation by or
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then means that  is better than or indi¤erent to . Notice that the
asymmetry of guaranties that is reexive and complete.
It is well known that many welfarist rules in the variable population context
may lead to the repugnant conclusion, introduced and discussed in [11], [12]
and [13], and widely considered within the literature (see, for instance, [2], [4],
[5] and [7]). In all of these works, it is assumed the existence of a utility level of
neutrality. A life of an individual is worth living if its utility, as a whole, is above
neutrality. We assume the existence of such a neutrality level which has been
normalized to zero. All individual utilities are fully measurable and interpersonal
comparable after this initial normalization. According to this interpretation, we
assume that all living individuals enjoy a standard of living above neutrality;
which means that the range of individual utilities is dened in the interval
. When a zero neutrality level is considered, the repugnant conclusion
may appear. Suppose the social evaluation rule to be Classical Utilitarianism,
according to which
,
By adding to any number of individuals with utilities arbitrarily close
to neutrality, the social ranking between and the new state (in which a
number of individuals near to starvation are added to ), may change. There are,
indeed, social evaluation operators which avoid this version of the repugnant
conclusion. The example suggested in [8] and [1] is a critical-level utilitarianism,
in which
,
where a positive constant representing a constant critical-level.
The present paper introduces a variable population social welfare rule based
on the use of the leximin criterion together with a .
Before presenting the notion of lets add the following piece of
notation. Consider two societies with utility distributions
will denote the utility distribution of a society obtained by the
union of the previous two.
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Denition 1.
Critical-Level Anonymity (C-L.A.):
Strict Monotonicity (S.Mon):
Given a associated to is a function
such that for all , If
such that then we say that is a .
Otherwise we call a .
;
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’ u ’ v ; ’
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n ; u ;
 ; ::; n ; ::; n ; ’ u ’  u :
n ; u; v ; u > v
’ u > ’ v :
n ; u ;
u u ; u ; ::; u ;  u g u ;
n;m m n; u ; v
r u r u r
v n v
u u r ;
u r u i ; ::; n u r r for k n ; ::; m:
v
v ; v v i ; ::; n :
critical-level
variable critical-level function
xed critical-level
critical-level function
critical-
level function
critical-level
critical-level
critical-level functions
.
A provides, for each distribution of individual utilities,
the utility that an additional person should enjoy in order to keep social welfare
unchanged, given that the utilities of the existing population are una¤ected.
First of all, we introduce the two following natural properties of a
.
for every
permutation
Critical-Level Anonymity says that the names of the agents do not a¤ect the
associated to a utility distribution.
if then
Strict Monotonicity calls for an increase of the whenever the
utility distribution of a given society changes in such a way that no agent is
worse-o¤ and at least one agent is better-o¤.
Examples of satisfying these properties can be found.
Consider, for instance, the arithmetic and the geometric
mean of denoted by and respectively. Particularly,
we are interested in the analysis of the critical-level egalitarian rule, an extension
of the leximin criterion to a variable population context Before presenting this
variable population welfare criterion, we introduce some additional notation.
For any with for any and for any
, stands for the m-dimensional extension of by means of and
stands for the reduction to dimension of , that is:
,
,
,
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Denition 2.
Denition 3.
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leximin
critical-
level egalitarian rule
critical-level function
n ;
; > ; u; v ;
u > v k ; ::; n u v i k ; ::; n u > v :
:
m
; u ;
v p q
i p q > p ;
ii p < q; u v u > v ; v u:
’
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u v
u > v p q
u ’ u > v q > p
u > v ’ v p > q
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For the (lexicographic Maximin) criterion on
is dened as follows. For all
For any function is the
if ,
if
if
if
Consider the utility distribution corresponding to three different
societies:
and
Suppose that the is the arithmetic mean, Then, given
that and ,
In the case of egalitarian and e¢cient rules (the leximin), there is no imme-
diate extension of this criterion to the domain An extension should, indeed,
reproduce the usual leximin when applied to the domain for all .
Take, as an example, the following extension such that
with
if ,
if otherwise
This is a very simple extension (the leximax criterion in the ranking sets
literature proceeds in a similar way -starting from the maximum-). The rule adds
to the usual leximin, a new command to compare vectors of di¤erent dimension
when the leximin criterion cannot reach a strict preference. In that case, the
larger vector is chosen. This criterion leads straightforward to the repugnant
conclusion. Therefore, to avoid the repugnant conclusion, we propose the
following extension of the leximin criterion, which will be called the critical-
level egalitarian rule.
In spite of this seemingly reasonable extension of the leximin rule, the use
of a strict monotonic and anonymous critical-level may lead to intransitivity of
the strict preference. Next example shows this statement.
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3. The meaning of transitivity
Number of Entrants Independence (N.E.I.)
Critical-Level Consistency (C-L.C.)
(9 9 9 9 2) (10 10 10 8 2)
(10 10 10 2) (20 10 5 9 5 2)
(20 10 5 10 5 9 5 2) (9 9 9 9 2)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) = ( ) =
( ( )) ( ( ))
u v ; ; ; ; > ; ; ; ; ;
v w ; ; ; > ; : ; : ; ;
w u ; : ; : ; : ; > ; ; ; ; :
’
’
’
;
x y not y z not x z
:
n ; u ;
’ u  ’ u;  :
u; v ;
u v u; ’ u v; ’ v :
critical-level egalitarian rule
critical-level function
critical-level egalitarian rule
critical-level egalitar-
ian rule
since
since
and since
From the previous example, some natural questions immediately arise. How
can we ensure that a is transitive? Are the
above listed properties on a compatible with a transitive
? Next section analyzes this kind of questions.
We have assumed the social evaluation rule, , to be asymmetric but, accord-
ing to example 1 presented above, we cannot guarantee the transitivity of ,
our candidate to encompass the e¢cient egalitarianism in a variable population
framework.
Next proposition characterizes the transitivity of a
by means of two appealing properties: Number of Entrants Indepen-
dence and Critical-Level Consistency.
Before presenting these conditions let us remark that all of the following
results have been established for the weak preference, associated to
(see section 2). It is well known that asymmetry and negative transitivity of
(that is, not and ) are equivalent to both
completeness and transitivity of Thus, Proposition 1 shows necessary and
su¢cient conditions for to be not only transitive, but negatively transitive
as well.
:
if then
Number of Entrants Independence requires the critical-level of a given society
to be the same as the critical-level of the society obtained by adding a member
to the initial one with a utility amount corresponding to its critical-level.
: Given and
Critical-Level Consistency demands the ranking between two utility distrib-
ution to be independent of the incorporation, to each society, of a further person
with the utility amount corresponding to its critical-level.
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We will establish the proof in three steps:
(i) If is transitive, then satises Number of Entrants Independence
and satises Critical-Level Consistency. Firstly, we will show that
if is transitive, then satises N.E.I. By denition of we have
that and Then tran-
sitivity implies Therefore
which implies Secondly, we will
show that if is transitive, then satises C-L.C. Consider
such that By denition of and
therefore and by transitivity
The converse is also true by a similar procedure.
(ii) If satises Number of Entrants Independence and satises Critical-
Level Consistency, then satises Extended Critical-Level Consistency,
that is, given , . Let
such that and let By applying C-L.C. we get
that Given that satises N. E. I.,
Then it is possible applying again
C-L.C. on and , getting that
Therefore
Repeating this reasoning (n-2) times we can get
(iii) if satises Extended Critical-Level Consistency and satises
Number of Entrants Independence, then is transitive. Let
such that and , and
with By applying Extended Critical-Level Consistency,
Number of Entrants Independence and taking into account the deni-
tion of
By using the same reasoning we get
Given that is transitive,
Now by denition
Finally, by applying once more Extended Critical-
Level Consistency,
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Proof.
Lemma 2:
Proof.
Proof of Theorem 1
critical-level egali-
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critical-level function
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Once we know necessary and su¢cient conditions for the
to be transitive, our aim is to explore the introduction of a variable
critical-level when we restrict the attention to this criterion. The unique prop-
erty on a , from the listed in section 1, which implies vari-
ability of the critical-level is Strict Monotonicity. This Monotonicity condition
get the idea behind the variable critical-level: A richer society welcomes new
members at a minimum standard of living greater than a poorer one. Unfortu-
nately, next result shows that the use of leximin evaluation with strict monotonic
critical-level leads to the intransitivity of the social evaluation rule.
satisfying Strict Monotonicity and such that
is transitive.
In order to proof the previous theorem we need the following lemmata.
If is transitive, then satises critical-Level Anonymity.
By denition of we get that
Moreover we know, by proposition 1, that tran-
sitivity implies Critical-Level Consistency, therefore ,
Again by denition of we get
satisfying
(i) Strict Monotonicity,
(ii) and such that
(iii) is transitive.
Suppose that satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii). Let
We know, by proposition 1, that transitivity of implies Number of
Entrants Independence, Therefore Consider
by (ii) and by construction therefore
. Now, since by applying Strict Monotonicity
we get which contradicts the previous inequality.
: Suppose that satisfying Strict
Monotonicity and such that is transitive. By lemma 2,
such that Consider, by lemma 1 , and construct a family of vectors
for and . There
are three possibilities:
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5. Weakening strict monotonicity
9 2 2

    8
   

9 2 2
8 2 8 2 8
!! 8 2
8 2
8 2
6 \ ;
 8 2 8 2

critical-level
critical-level egalitarian rule
[0 ) ( ) 0 ( (0 )) ( ( ))
(0 ) ( ) [( ( 0)] [( ( 0)] =
= [( ( )] [( ( 0)] = [ (( )] 2
( (0 )) ( ( ))
( (0 )) ( (0 0)) ( )
( (0 ) ( (0 )))
( ( ) ( ( )))
[0 ) ( ) 0 ( (0 )) = ( ( ))
= ( (0 )) ( ( ))
[0 ) ( ) 0 ( (0 )) ( ( ))
: [0 ) [0 )
0 ( ) = [ ( (0 )) ( ( ))]
[0 ) ( ) = [ ]
( (0 )) ( ( )) [0 )
= ( ) ( ) =
[0 )
( )
( )
x ; b ; y x; b k > ’ v ; x < ’ v k; y :
; v ; x v k; y v x; > v x;
u x > u y v y; k v x; v y; k j > :
’ v ; x < ’ v k; y
’ v ; x ’ v ; ’ u < u y
v ; x ; ’ v ; x
v k; y ; ’ v k; y :
x ; b ; y x; b k > ’ v ; x ’ v k; y :
z ’ v ; x < ’ v k; z :
x ; b ; y x; b k > ; ’ v ; x > ’ v k; y :
F ; b z ; b ;
k > ; F z ’ v ; z ; ’ v k ; z :
F z ; b ; F z a; b
a < b: x > y
’ v ; x > ’ v k; y x; y ; b ;
x y; F x F y :
; b
n ; u; v ; u >> v ’ u >
’ v :
’
(i) and such that On one
hand, by denition of because
and On the other
hand and taking into account that, by hypothesis, and ,
by Strict Monotonicity, , the introduction
of the critical levels will change the ordination, that is,
But this fact contradicts Critical-Level Consistency and,
by proposition 1, transitivity.
(ii) and such that By
taking we are in case (i) since
(iii) and In this
case we dene the correspondence such that
and a xed Notice that, by Strict
Monotonicity, is always multivaluated, that is,
with Moreover by supposing, without loss of generality, and taking
into account the hypothesis we get that
But, since the number of disjoint intervals in is
numerable and is not, our conclusion is absurd.
The next natural step, from the previous impossibility result, is to weaken the
strict monotonicity property of the critical-level function. We propose the fol-
lowing:
if then
Monotonicity calls for an increase of the whenever the utility
distribution of a given society changes in such a way that each individual is
better-o¤.
The following result shows that when this version of monotonicity is required
there exists an interesting class of variable critical-level functions compatible
with the transitivity of the - . This class share the
spirit of what has been called Positional Dictatorship in social choice theory;
a social evaluation rule, , is a Positional Dictatorship if there is a position k
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such that The application of this idea to our setting may be
seen in the following result and a particular case can be found in [3].
Let dened as follows,
Then satises Monotonicity and is transitive.
It is straightforward to check that satises Monotonicity. Firstly, we
will show that satises Number of Entrants Independence. Consider
such that If so If
therefore Secondly, we will
show that satises Critical-Level Consistency. Consider
and and suppose, without loss of generality, that In this case,
so by Number of Entrants Independence and taking into
account that we get
which implies and Con-
versely, implies that , then
now by Number of Entrants Independence
therefore we get so If suppose
that , then Case of
then Case of
then there exist such that with equality for
Therefore, if we add ,by Number of Entrants Inde-
pendence, and we get with equality for
Then Conversely, let
Suppose that and
for then which implies If the rst
inequality between and appears before coordinate k, then
obviously If the rst inequality between and appears
after coordinate k, and again Case of the reasoning
is analogous.
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